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Abstract 
This paper investigates private sector investment in conservation and ecotourism through conservancy land leases in 
the Mara region of Kenya. In a recent and growing tourism development, groups of Maasai landowners are leasing 
their parcels of land to tourism investors and forming wildlife conservancies. The paper examines this new 
conservation and ecotourism model and the implications it has for Maasai livelihoods and the environment. The 
subdivision of Kenya’s rangelands has tended to benefit elites, and as a consequence this trend is reinforced in land-
based schemes such as these. Given the large extent and recent change in ownership in these areas, land leases do 
however keep the lands they cover together and are potentially an optimistic outlook for such open rangeland 
areas. Consideration however must be given to adjacent areas and communities that may face the negative knock 
on effects of such schemes. The Mara is a unique area in terms of its tourism and wildlife, so land leases may not be 
able to offer as much to landowners in other areas, or be financially sustainable across vast areas. However, within 
the Mara, land leases have been rapidly expanded upon, implying that similar schemes might be of interest to both 
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1. Introduction 
Conservation and ecotourism developments have been identified as one of seven processes driving global 'land grabs' 
(Zoomers 2010). Although most 'land grabs' result from large scale land acquisitions in developing countries by 
finance-rich, resource-poor countries to satisfy their food and fuel requirements (Cotula et al 2009; Zoomers 2010), 
increasingly private individuals and international organisations are investing in large areas of land for nature 
conservation, triggering a ‘great green land grab’ (Vidal 2008). Echoing land appropriation under European 
colonialism, this trend might simply be portrayed as a reinvention of a phenomenon that has occurred for centuries. 
For example, in colonial Africa in the first half of the 20th century, British colonial conservationists alienated African 
land to create game reserves, influenced by western ideals for ‘wilderness’ and ‘pristine’ habitats free of people and 
human habitation (Adams & Hutton 2007). 
 
Private individuals, trusts, conservation NGOs, and for-profit businesses are all purchasing or leasing conservation land 
or resource rights from governments and local communities. The largest conservation NGOs in the USA have extensive 
networks of protected areas worldwide. Privately owned and managed, protected areas can make significant 
contributions to conservation real estate and be important in achieving biodiversity conservation goals. This is all the 
more important as much biodiversity falls outside of formally protected areas (Western et al 2009). Private sector 
conservation action is increasingly recognised as an important form of governance for protected areas (World 
Conservation Union 2005:177) and is continuing to attract donor support (e.g. The Global Environment Facility’s 
funding for private sector initiatives (GEF 2011)). Despite the proliferation of growth and interest in private sector 
investment in conservation, this has not always translated into positive impacts for local communities. Serious human 
rights issues were raised in 2004 when the African Parks Foundation (APF), a private Dutch-based organisation, who 
aim to run parks as businesses, was contracted by the Ethiopian government to manage Nechasar National Park. Just 
months after signing the agreement 500 people were removed from the park and 463 houses burned down to try to 
force them to leave (Pearce 2005). In Tanzania, the African Wildlife Foundation’s (AWF) involvement in Manyara 
Ranch, a livestock ranch now managed as a protected area, also led to the displacement of local people, who lost 
access to land for their livelihoods (Igoe 2007; Igoe & Croucher 2007). As for other types of 'land grabbing' (Cotula et 
al 2009) such cases, justify displacing people on the grounds that the land appears ‘empty’, ‘idle’ or ‘unoccupied’. In 
reality, these areas might be important dry season grazing reserves, shifting cultivation systems or sacred sites. 
 
This paper investigates private sector investment in conservation and ecotourism through conservancy land leases in 
the Mara region, Kenya. In a recent and growing tourism development, groups of Maasai landowners are leasing their 
land parcels to tourism investors and forming wildlife conservancies. Landowners receive a direct monthly lease 
payment in return for setting aside their land for conservation. The paper examines this new conservation and 
ecotourism model and the implications for Maasai livelihoods and the environment. As in other parts of Maasailand, 
the Mara is an area that has witnessed great changes in land tenure from communal to individual ownership. 
Successive Kenyan government have pursued this policy with consistency, under the belief that economic growth 
depends on transforming customary land tenure to private land ownership based on the western model. In this paper 
I first introduce the Maasai and the history of land tenure change in Kenya’s Maasailand, then the Mara study site and 
its subdivision process and history of conservation initiatives. I present a case study of tourism investment through 
conservancy land leases and investigate the partnership between the community and tourism investors, and the 
restrictions on livelihood activities that the land lease brings. Finally, I reflect on how the conservancy land leases 
impinge on Maasai land rights, pastoral livelihoods and on the environment. 
 
2 Methods 
Case study data were collected during field research in Koyiaki Group Ranch from January to November 2010. I 
conducted Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with people in administrative and leadership positions in conservancies, 
previous wildlife associations, and the group ranch; and semi-structured interviews with individuals or groups from 
the community. Interviews targeted conservancy members and non-members, were held in all areas throughout the 
group ranch, and targeted men and women equally. Most KIIs were conducted in English; community interviews in 
Maa with the help of a translator. Data were supplemented by numerous informal conversations, participant 
observation and attending various community and conservancy meetings. The history of land tenure and conservation 
initiatives in Koyiaki and neighbouring group ranches was explored in the literature, government documents and KIIs. 
Interviews collected data on: the formation, management and partnership arrangements of land leases and the 
conservancies they form; land tenure and land use within the conservancies and wider group ranch; and the costs and 
benefits community members experience due to land leases and the conservancies they form. 
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3 Maasai pastoralism and land tenure change 
The Maasai are predominantly a pastoral people, dependent on their cattle, sheep and goats. Livestock are of central 
economic and cultural importance to the Maasai, and remain the focus of social relationships. Cultivation however 
plays an important role in the livelihoods of many contemporary Maasai, and although Maasai communities remain 
primarily dependent on livestock for their livelihoods, the majority are also diversifying to agro-pastoralism, or away 
from natural resource based livelihoods to off-farm activities such as business and tourism (Homewood et al 2009). 
 
Maasai pastoralism has traditionally centred on livestock mobility and the seasonal tracking of communal pasture and 
water resources to cope with the unpredictable physical environment. Herd movements within, and outside of, 
Maasai territories were negotiated and mediated by councils of elders. This however was disrupted when the colonial 
administration imposed new policies of rangeland management, and reallocated rights of access to land and water 
resources (Waller 1988). They promoted the sedentarisation of the Maasai, and alienated Maasai lands for use by 
white settlers. As privatisation and the ensuing expropriation of land continued, Maasai lost access to their former 
rangelands and traditional grazing sites, and livestock mobility became increasingly restricted. 
3.1 History of land policy and tenure in Kenya’s Maasailand 
Colonial period 
At the end of the nineteenth century, incoming British colonists saw much of Maasailand as vast and unoccupied, 
partly as a result of the Maasai’s seasonal use of the land, and partly because a series of disease epidemics left both 
the Maasai population and their cattle temporarily decimated (Campbell 1993; Waller 1988). Maasai land was given to 
European settlers whilst Maasai were relocated to native reserves. In 1906, the Northern and Southern Reserves were 
established, into which several sections of Maasai were concentrated (Hughes 2006). A few years later Maasai were 
again moved, from their Northern Reserve on the Laikipia Plateau, and became concentrated in the Southern Reserve 
in Narok and Kajiado Districts (Hughes 2006); they lost land to neighbouring agricultural groups, and also to wildlife 
conservation through the National Parks’ formation, first by Europeans and then continuing post-independence. 
Post-independence and group ranches 
A series of land policies first laid-out by the colonial government, and then continued by the post-independence 
government, promoted the privatisation of land tenure in Kenya. This was based on the belief that indigenous systems 
of land management resulted in land degradation as they encouraged pastoralists to keep excessively large numbers 
of cattle. Privatisation was driven by economic incentives to intensify and commercialise livestock production and 
convert higher potential areas to cultivation. 
 
In 1968, with help from USAID and the World Bank, Kenya promoted ‘group ranches’ in pastoral areas that gave 
groups of people formal and legal tenure over land. Group ranches were introduced in the expectation they would 
provide tenure security thus creating incentives for the Maasai to invest in range improvement and reduce the 
tendency to accumulate livestock. The ‘Land Group Representatives and Land Adjudication Act’ of 1968 enabled land 
to be demarcated into group ranches, which were owned and under private title by a group of registered members, 
and managed by an elected group ranch committee (Galaty 1992). The group ranch maintained agreed stocking levels 
and herded their livestock collectively, but owned them individually. The concept of group ranches was initially 
accepted by Maasai as a way to provide security of tenure and to prevent further land encroachment by the 
government, outside cultivators and Maasai elites (Bekure et al 1991; Galaty & Ole Munei 1999; Grandin 1986). 
However, the land adjudication process was associated with a number of problems. The group ranch committees 
failed to represent the interests of the wider community and large areas of land were allocated to individuals from 
both within and outside the Maasai community (Galaty 1992). The committees were able to allocate themselves, or 
individuals in positions of power and influence, titles to privately-owned areas excised from the rest of the group 
ranch (Galaty 1993; 1999; Galaty & Ole Munei 1999; Homewood et al 2004; Thompson & Homewood 2002). Much of 
this land was subsequently sold on to incoming cultivating groups. 
Subdivision of group ranches 
In Kajiado District pressure began to mount to subdivide the group ranches as early as the mid-1970s to 1980s 
(Mwangi 2007a). Unlike the previous division of land, this pressure emerged largely from the Maasai community itself 
(Kimani & Pickard 1998; Mwangi 2007a; Rutten 1992), although government and donor policies were widely 
supportive of it. In defence against land appropriation by the state or elites from both within and outside the Maasai 
community, the Maasai chose to formalise their individual rights to land by holding private title. 
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The subdivision process has been widely documented as being corrupt with cases of manipulation of land titling and 
illegal practices (Galaty 1999; Galaty & Ole Munei 1999; Mwangi 2007b; Thompson & Homewood 2002). Subdivision 
favoured the wealthy and the powerful group ranch committees who primarily catered for their own interests. 
Contrary to members’ expectations, subdivision did not result in equal land parcels (Mwangi 2007b). Instead, 
committee members and other elites captured the largest and most fertile portions of land and those with the highest 
business potential (Galaty 1999; Mwangi 2007b). Wealthy individuals able to buy influence, and those with close ties 
to committee members were given large shares, whereas those that had disagreements with the committee were 
punished with smaller parcel sizes (Mwangi 2007b). Women, the youth, and other weak and marginalised groups and 
individuals were not included on the group ranch registers and so were dispossessed of land altogether (Talle 1988, 
1999). Subdivision resulted in large tracts of land falling into the hands of non-Maasai due to the onward sale of plots 
and the corrupt registration of people outside of the group ranch who were given land titles (Galaty 1999; Kimani & 
Pickard 1998; Rutten 1992). 
3.2 Land privatisation — land loss or opportunity for investment? 
The privatisation process presented opportunities for land grabbing at every level with corrupt committees, Maasai 
elites, political leaders and outsiders expropriating the largest and best-placed Maasai lands. From colonisation, to the 
setting up of, and eventual subdivision of, group ranches, Maasai permanently lost rights of access to large parts of 
their former range. Maasai were in favour of the subdivision of group ranches to formalise their individual rights to 
land in defence against further land grabbing (Mwangi 2007a). Maasai were also motivated by the opportunities that 
individual title and control of land could bring, such as access to capital, loans and opportunities for investment 
(Mwangi 2007a). Influential economist, Hernando de Soto (2000), argues that because the poor lack legal ownership 
of their property they are unable to unlock the capital potential of the assets they hold, and so remain in poverty. By 
formalising their property rights, including formal titling of land, this increases investment opportunities and provides 
better access to credit and financial markets, ultimately improving their livelihoods. His idea has been taken on by 
many donor agencies, including the World Bank, who advocate for formalised land rights in their land reform 
programs. In the Mara, holding title to land can bring opportunities for investment and new income streams — such 
as leasing land for cultivation, selling land, and capturing returns from wildlife (Thompson & Homewood 2002). It also, 
importantly, allows for the direct capture of benefits at the household or individual level rather than at the 
community level (ibid). 
 
However, as critics of de Soto point out, his ideas oversimplify what may be complex social settings where obstacles 
exist for the poor to enter the formal economy. For example, banks may be unwilling to lend to small-scale 
landowners, who in turn may be unwilling to use their land as collateral due to the risks of repossession (Nyamu-
Musembi 2006; Cousins et al 2005). In fact, little evidence exists that land titling actually increases access to credit or 
investment (Nyamu-Musembi 2006; Cousins et al 2005). Moreover, land titling programmes, as the Kenya case has 
shown, run the risk of elite capture resulting in an inequality of land ownership. They also don’t recognise customary 
forms of tenure and do little to protect the rights of land users depending on a commons resource. 
 
In this paper, I investigate a new investment on privatised land, in the form of conservancy land leases, and ask to 
what extent are Maasai able to benefit from this investment on their land? Many Maasai now hold secure title to land, 
albeit through a largely inequitable process of subdivision and allocation, and have the option of leasing out their land 
for conservation and tourism. How secure are their land rights, and what rights are they required to give up? What is 
the nature of the partnership between the Maasai landowners and the tourism investors? Also, what do land leases 
mean for those people who don’t own land but may live within, or border, a conservancy area? 
 
4 The Mara 
The Mara in south-west Kenya is made up of the Maasai Mara National Reserve (MMNR) and the surrounding pastoral 
rangelands (Figure 1). The MMNR provides dry season grazing habitat and permanent water sources of critical 
importance to a number of migratory and non-migratory wildlife species that then disperse out of the MMNR during 
the wet season and graze on the neighbouring pastoral rangelands. The MMNR also provides critically dry season 
grazing to livestock from the neighbouring rangelands (Butt 2007), although this practice is illegal, and land use in the 
MMNR is officially restricted to wildlife tourism. 
 
For centuries the Maasai have grazed their livestock largely in coexistence with wildlife. Today, land use pressures due 
to increasing human and livestock populations, commercial cultivation and land subdivision, mean that wildlife and 
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Maasai are competing for space. As a result of these pressures, wildlife populations in the Mara have declined by 70% 
in the last 30 years (Ogutu et al 2009, 2011; Ottichilo et al 2000, 2001). 
Figure 1: Koyiaki and neighbouring group ranches, Maasai Mara National Reserve and conservancy areas 
 
4.1 Changing patterns of land tenure 
The pastoral rangelands adjacent to the MMNR are made up of the former group ranches including Koyiaki, Lemek, 
Siana, and Olkinyei (Figure 1). All ranches, apart from Siana, have now been fully subdivided. Koyiaki Group Ranch, the 
focus of this study, completed its subdivision process by late 2009, and individual plots have been allocated to 
registered group ranch members. The ranch was divided in five separate blocks for the purposes of land surveys and 
subdivision, and subdivision occurred in at least three separate rounds over a period of 25 years. Land was allocated 
to men only as only adult men are included on the group ranch registers — in some cases children of the group ranch 
committee, or other well-connected members, got their names on the register, and were thus also allocated land. 
 
Subdivision started in 1984 with the Talek area (block five) directly on the MMNR border when this area was excised 
from the MMNR and subdivided and allocated into 154 plots (Thompson et al 2009). Land in blocks one and two was 
then subdivided and allocated from 2001–2004 with each member due to receive 150 acres (Thompson et al 2009). By 
2004, Thompson et al (2009), found that 88% of households sampled in Koyiaki and Lemek group ranches owned land. 
Land in the final two blocks, three and four, was delayed pending a court case contesting a number of land allocation 
irregularities and conflicts. Membership of the Koyiaki Group Ranch register has been a contentious issue; a number 
of households (allegedly 300 of an estimated 800 in Koyiaki in 1999) were not allocated land as the validity of their 
land claims were questioned (Lamprey & Reid 2004). Blocks three and four were finally subdivided and allocated in 
late 2009, and many of those people who didn’t receive land in previous allocations, as well as the sons of members 
who were too young to receive land in the first and second rounds were able to secure a plot. The size of these plots 
has tended to fall short of the 150 acres allocated in previous rounds. 
 
There are a number of people living within Koyiaki Group Ranch who were not allocated land. This in the majority of 
cases includes those people excluded from the group ranch register; for example the young and politically 
marginalised. Many people from neighbouring group ranches also live within Koyiaki. Some of these groups have 
secured land through buying it, whereas others are staying due to the good will of the landowners on whose land they 
reside. 
4.2 Tourism and wildlife revenues 
The MMNR is a nationally protected area, established in 1961 and owned by the Government of Kenya, but managed 
by the Narok and Trans-Mara District County Councils. The Trans-Mara District incorporates the western portion of 
the MMNR, known as the ‘Mara Triangle’, and is managed by Trans-Mara County Council. The remainder of the 
Conservation and ecotourism on privatised land in the Mara, Kenya P a g e  | 5 
 
 
Land Deal Politics Initiative 
MMNR falls within Narok District and is managed by Narok County Council. In 2009 the MMNR was amongst the top 
three most visited National Parks or Reserves in Kenya (Ministry of Tourism 2010) bringing in valuable tourism 
revenue. Little of this revenue however tends to end up with the Reserve’s neighbouring communities that host 
wildlife and tourists on their land. Maasai communities may capture as little as 5% of tourism revenues with the rest 
accruing to tourism operators and associated support services (Norton-Griffiths & Said 2010). A string of initiatives in 
the Mara have attempted to disperse tourism revenues to the local Maasai communities. These however have tended 
to fail as a result of poor accountability and corrupt management practices. 
Previous structures administering wildlife revenues to the community 
In 1988, Narok County Council started to make payments of 19% of gate revenues collected from the MMNR to nine 
group ranches adjacent to the reserve (Thompson & Homewood 2002). These funds were used at the community level 
to finance community projects, school bursaries and medical bills. Ordinary group ranch members in reality received 
little of this, as money was diverted largely to county council and group ranch officials (Thompson & Homewood 
2002). In an effort to capture wildlife revenues more directly, from 1994, wildlife associations were set up on group 
ranch land outside the MMNR by group ranch residents. The wildlife associations collected revenue from visitor 
entrance and bed night fees and were able to generate considerable revenues. Again, distributional issues meant that 
ordinary group ranch members saw very little of the income generated as the majority was diverted to association 
officials and staff. Each wildlife association tended to have several officials and staff each requiring their share of 
benefits and salaries. In 1997, staff of one association received 56% of the association’s annual income, totalling more 
than half a million dollars, whereas members received just 16% (Thompson & Homewood 2002). In the late 1990s — 
and made apparent by the privatisation of land – wildlife associations began to fragment as the leadership excluded 
households on the basis that they could generate income from cultivation or had few tourist facilities or vehicles on 
their land. As a result, the remaining membership was able to benefit from larger payments (Thompson et al 2009). 
The Koyiaki-Lemek Wildlife Trust, initially congruent with Koyiaki and Lemek group ranches, by 2009 had split into 12 
different associations due to political and economic competition; six in Lemek and six in Koyiaki (KII 22). Research 
investigating trends in returns from wildlife in the Mara over a similar time period showed that as a result, wildlife 
revenue became concentrated amongst fewer households, and those that did receive a payment saw a significant 
decline in their income (Thompson et al 2009). 
 
5 The beginning of a new conservancy model 
The fragmenting, splitting and exclusive nature of wildlife associations following land subdivision and internal political-
economic rivalry created opportunities for the establishment of new institutional models for wildlife conservation in 
the former Koyiaki Group Ranch. In May 2006 the Olare Orok Conservancy (OOC) was set up when it initiated 
conservation land lease payments to landowners on a prime piece of land adjacent to the MMNR (Figure 2). The OOC 
falls within block two of Koyiaki, an area that had previously been excluded from the larger Koyiaki-Lemek Wildlife 
Trust in 2003. There were few tourism camps in the area, and as a result landowners were receiving little money from 
tourism (KII 2). In just a couple of years 14 land parcels (of approximately 50 acres each) in the area which OOC now 
falls, were sold on to individuals and companies outside of the Maasai community as landowners saw little value to 
the land (KIIs 7 & 8). Incomers came in with the intention of putting up large houses or investing in new camps. 
 
A former chief, with a large parcel of land in this area, bordering the MMNR and adjacent to a high-end tourist camp, 
was influential in the formation of this new conservation area. Porini Ecotourism, a tour operator with an eco-camp 
within the OOC area and experience of setting up conservation areas with Maasai communities elsewhere in the 
Mara1 and Amboseli, also had an important stake in the area. The development of a nearby small trading-centre, 
accompanying bars, and the growth of pastoral settlements with livestock, had already caused the tour operator to 
begin to lease out neighbouring parcels of land to maintain an exclusive area for wildlife and tourism, and reduce 
vehicle, cattle and people movement in the area directly adjacent to the camp (KII 15). The former chief and the 
managing director of Porini Ecotourism, together with the help of two facilitators, introduced to the landowner 
community the idea of setting up a conservancy. One of the facilitators had recently bought a 300 acre plot in the area 
to retire on after many years in the ranching and tourism industries. The other facilitator was a resident from a 
neighbouring group ranch and a researcher/community facilitator with an international research institute and had 
worked with the former Koyiaki-Lemek Wildlife Trust.  
 
                                                             
1 The Olkinyei Conservancy in neighbouring Olkinyei group ranch was set up at a similar time to OOC in partnership with Porini 
Ecotourism (Figure 2). 
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The conservancy land lease model introduced differed from any previous conservation model or wildlife association in 
the Mara. Landowners were offered a fixed monthly lease payment based on land size, in return for moving off their 
land and agreeing to certain restrictions on land use activities. The tourism partners would guarantee the payment 
regardless of visitor numbers, and their camps would have exclusive wildlife viewing access to the conservancy. A 
number of community meetings were held with local residents and landowners, many of who were sceptical about 
the intentions of the new conservancy and did not at the outset sign-up (KII 17). The small size of the conservancy was 
said to be important in helping to manage any disagreements and local politics within the community (KIIs 6 & 7). The 
two facilitators played key roles in putting forward the idea to landowners as they were respected members of the 
community with backgrounds in, and vital links to, the local community and tourism industry respectively. There was 
little objection to the conservancy from prominent people receiving large revenues from the wildlife associations and 
lodges in block one. They did not think a conservancy would work since there had been few camps and little tourism 
interest within the area (KII 7). The few tourism operators that did have camps within OOC, as a result didn’t have any 
real competitors and were able to initiate the conservancy with little objection from the part of the tourist industry 
and its key beneficiaries (KII 2). The area was even viewed by some as little used and not suitable for cattle grazing due 
to the presence of tsetse fly (KII 6), despite there being some 450 pastoralist residents within the area. 
 
Although the tourism partners preferred a longer lease contract, an initial contract was signed between the 
landowners and tourism partners in 2006 for 18 months, agreeing to lease the land at US$20 ha-1/yr-1. The initial 
instalment was paid directly to landowners in cash, thereafter the payment being sent to newly set-up landowners’ 
bank accounts. This has been a common trend with subsequent conservancies, as the cash payment acts as a large 
incentive encouraging landowners to sign on the day (KII 15). Following this initial period a 5-year lease contract was 
signed and  in 2010 the tourism partners introduced a 15-year lease contract. In the OOC alone, the tourism partners 
finance US$35 000 in lease fees per month. They therefore pushed for a longer lease period under which they could 
guarantee their investment in the longer-term. The new contract was backdated by a few months, creating a back-
payment, again making a strong incentive for landowners to sign-up (KII 14). 
 
Figure 2: Conservancies adjacent to the Maasai 
Mara National Reserve
 
Figure 3: Blocks 1 & 2 of Koyiaki and conservancies 
Source: Map courtesy of OOC 2010. 
A few landowners refused to sign the 15-year contract due to concerns over the long length of the lease period, the 
current management, and the payment amount (KIIs 14 & 18). These landowners remain under the 5-year contract at 
a lower payment rent. Under the 15-year contract the payment is set to increase annually by 5% for the first five years 
and then by 8% per annum for the remaining ten years, and currently stands at US$43 ha-1/yr-1. There are currently 
154 members of OOC, whose land parcels make up an area of 9720ha (Figure 3). 
 
6  The community-investor partnership 
The land lease model comprises a new type of partnership in the Mara unlike any previous arrangements 
administering tourism revenues to communities. Here I use the OOC case study, being the pioneer and the most 
established land lease programme, to demonstrate the current partnership model in operation. A similar model has 
since been replicated in subsequent land lease programmes. Figure 4 illustrates the partnership schematically. 
Motorogi Conservancy 
OOC 
Conservation and ecotourism on privatised land in the Mara, Kenya P a g e  | 7 
 
 
Land Deal Politics Initiative 
Figure 4: Partnership model within the Olare Orok Conservancy (OOC) land lease programme 
 
The group of 154 landowners whose land falls within the OOC boundaries, and who opted to join the conservancy, 
formed their own landholding company, the Olare Orok Wildlife Conservancy (OOWC) Ltd. This non-profit company, 
under which each landowner’s lease is held, is registered with the local land control board, through which all 
agricultural land transactions must be approved. Ownership of each parcel is therefore retained within the 
landowners’ own company. Kenyan law under the Land Control Act does not permit any non-Kenyan citizens to own 
or lease agricultural land (NCLR 2010), and since the tourism investors are not all Kenyan citizens they are unable to 
hold the leases themselves (KII 14). This key aspect of the model retains land ownership with the landowners 
themselves, thus giving them a strong position within the partnership with the tourism investors. 
 
An OOWC land committee has been formed whose members act as representatives of the wider group of landowners. 
Unlike previous wildlife associations, the committee is not involved in distributing lease payments and has minimal 
running costs, with only one paid member (KII 14). Committee members should be elected by the landowners and 
ensure representation of all sub-areas within Koyiaki group ranch (KII 17). However, as with the other conservancies, 
members reported they did not always know how their land committee was elected, or complained that the 
committee had just been appointed without any election process (Community interviews). Some prominent 
community members are in fact members of two or three conservancy land committees, most likely able to secure 
their positions through power and status. The committee must ensure landowners are well informed about the 
conservancy’s activities and pass on landowners’ views at regular meetings with conservancy management. Meetings 
with all the landowners are generally only held yearly due to the large numbers of dispersed members and practical 
difficulties of bringing everyone together (KIIs 17 & 20), except for meetings held to signing or renewing the lease 
contract. In certain conservancies these are the only meetings that some landowners have ever attended with 
landowners claiming they were not fully aware of the land lease details before signing (Community interviews). 
 
In the OOC, the four tourism partners have also formed their own non-profit management company, Olpurkel Ltd, 
which has a conservancy management contract from OOWC. The four tourism partners are Olpurkel shareholders, 
who have underwritten the financial agreement to pay leases to landowners, financed through the daily tourist 
entrance fees into the OOC, which currently stand at US$80 per person (the rate is tied to, and thus increases with, 
the visitor entrance fees of the MMNR). Marketed as a high-end low-impact safari destination, OOC policy restricts 
one tourist bed to every 300 acres allowing a total of 72 beds within the conservancy; at 35% occupancy the tourism 
partners are able to cover the cost of the guaranteed land rent. If occupancy goes above this, any profit is reportedly 
held for financial security in case of tourism downturns such as following the 2007 election, as well as for 
infrastructure and community welfare projects (KII 14). The Olpurkel board of directors consists of the tourism 
partners, but also has representatives from the landholding company. Olpurkel pays the lease fee to the landholding 
company through a conservancy management committee. The conservancy management committee has a joint 
management structure with representatives from both OOWC and Olpurkel, who meet monthly to discuss 
conservancy issues (KII 18). The management is also responsible for security, infrastructure and maintenance within 
the conservancy. In a different management arrangement, MNC have hired an independent management company, 
Seyia Ltd, to do their financial accounting, security and maintenance. 
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The OOC Trust is a charity that was set up to channel donor funding to the conservancy and run community welfare 
and conservation projects for the wider Mara area, not just to the OOC or its members. Through donations, the Trust 
finances the base management costs of the conservancy, such as equipment and vehicles. The Trust also finances and 
runs a community outreach programme to school children and women throughout Koyiaki, as it was recognised these 
groups were largely uninformed about the conservancy’s activities (Courtney 2009; KII 23). Subsequent conservancies 
have set up similar trusts through which they manage donor funds that support community projects in nearby schools 
and health centres, and in improving access to clean water for people and livestock. 
 
7 Conservancy replication 
The land lease model described above has been subsequently replicated and a number of new conservancies set up in 
the former Koyiaki Group Ranch and the wider Mara area (figure 5). Shortly after the OOC was set up, an adjoining 
area, the Motorogi Conservancy, was formed as an expansion to the OOC (Figure 3). The Motorogi Conservancy does 
not yet have any tourism camps; the same tourism investors are financing the area as OOC, including Virgin Ltd. Virgin 
specifically came in with interest to expand OOC conservancy to the Motorogi area following visits to the area in 2007 
and 2008. Richard Branson visited the area in early 2008 to open new facilities that Virgin had financed at a primary 
school in Sekenani town, on the border of the MMNR; this coincided with the launch of Virgin Atlantic’s new air route 
from London to Nairobi. Virgin have delayed building their camp in Motorogi, partly due to 2007 post-election 
violence in Kenya and the ensuing drop in tourism, but construction is now underway (KII 4). 
 
In 2009 and 2010, the two largest conservancies, both in terms of land size and membership, were set up — the Mara 
North Conservancy (MNC) and Naboisho Conservancy. The MNC was formed in the area that was once under the 
numerous Koyiaki-Lemek wildlife associations. As a result it took much discussion and negotiation within the 
community to bring the landowners back together, and between the community and investors to eventually come up 
with a new tourism initiative and partnership model2. Naboisho Conservancy was introduced and initially donor 
financed through Basecamp Foundation, whose commercial arm, Basecamp Explorer has a lodge in the conservancy, 
and one just outside of the conservancy. Naboisho Conservancy was formed in the area of Koyiaki only subdivided and 
allocated in late 2009, following delays due to land allocation irregularities and conflicts. As land leases require clear 
title to land, Basecamp had to wait till the allocation process was complete before being able to initiate the 
conservancy. This process was delayed by a court case where a number of people were contesting that they were not 
allocated land during subdivision of blocks one and two (KII 15). There were also delays following the irregular 
allocation of land proposed for new tourism camps to some community leaders, which were later reversed (KII 14). 
Following initial donor financing, five tourism investors are now putting camps in the Conservancy to take over 
financing the lease payments and management costs (KIIs 20 & 25). Naboisho Conservancy introduced a 15 year lease 
contract from the outset, which likely helped other conservancies to do the same. 












Current monthly lease 




5 yr* 15 yr** 
OOC Koyiaki 2006 154 4 33 43 9720 
Motorogi Conservancy Koyiaki 2007 120 4 33 43 5466 
MNC Koyiaki 
and Lemek 
2009 900 10 33 40 30000 




N/A 27 20628 
*Under the 5 year contract; **Under the 15 year contract 
                                                             
2 The MNC was formed from block one in Koyiaki Group Ranch and the Lemek Hills in Lemek Group Ranch. The rest of Lemek Group 
Ranch formed the Lemek Conservancy, based on visitor bed nights rather than land rent, as this is more profitable to its members 
(KIIs 19, 22). 
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8 Land use restrictions 
In the conservancies described so far, landowners, by signing the land lease contract, agree to certain land use 
restrictions. These apply to settlements, livestock grazing, land sales, cultivation, fencing, any land development, or 
any collection of natural resources such as firewood or stones. In some cases walking through the conservancy is also 
forbidden and members or non-members can be fined for this (KII 22). 
8.1 Settlements 
On a number of occasions conservancies have moved people off their land in order to form people-free new 
conservation areas. This was most prominently seen in the case of OOC, when approximately 450 people and their 
livestock, making up some 25 independent settlements were moved before the conservancy was set up ( KII 19; 
Community interviews). The conservancy provided people with transport to move their belongings, but no financial 
compensation was given. In Motorogi Conservancy, a number of settlements were moved, but others were allowed to 
remain. Many of the people that were moved from OOC and Motorogi did not own land there, or in cases anywhere 
else. Many therefore moved to blocks three and four, just across a main road, where land at that time was still un-
subdivided, with the hopes of eventually being allocated land there. This land was eventually subdivided and sections 
turned into Naboisho Conservancy, those who were not fortunate to receive land, were again asked to move on, and 
now deliberate as to where they are to move next (Community interiews). 
 
In some cases, conservancies allow settlements to remain if they are not in the core conservation area of the 
conservancy or close to camps. For example in MNC, there are a number of settlements, distributed in three main 
areas on the boundaries of the conservancy. In the core area of Naboisho Conservancy there are also very few 
settlements, since historically this area has been heavily infested with tsetse fly. 
Grazing 
All conservancies have set up certain rules and restrictions for livestock grazing inside their boundaries. These usually 
follow controlled grazing plans, which restrict the number of livestock allowed into the conservancy, and the areas 
where they can graze. This ranges from only allowing livestock grazing in the conservancy during the tourism low 
season, to more flexible grazing plans, limiting grazing in areas close to camps, but allowing rotational grazing in areas 
away from camps. Usually the herds neighbouring the conservancy are allowed access, on a rotational basis, as 
different parts of the conservancy are opened up at different times (KIIs 14, 17, 18, 25). The restriction of grazing in 
conservancies has been a very contentious issue, creating a lot of community conflict. Large areas of previous grazing 
land have been for the most part removed from pastoral use. When conservancies do allow livestock grazing, this is 
often agreed for conservancy members’ livestock only (KIIs 16 and 26; Community interviews). Those who are not 
members of a conservancy may thus be excluded from grazing inside a conservancy area, and on top of which they 
will have to accommodate conservancy members’ livestock on their land throughout the year (KIIs 6, 14 and 26; 
Community interviews). 
 
Despite the grazing rules there is a lot of illegal grazing by both conservancy members and non-members. Conservancy 
rangers monitor and enforce grazing rules, and if herds are caught the owners are fined either US$63 or US$125 
depending on the conservancy – similarly, the fine for illegal grazing in the MMNR is US$125 or 10,000KSh3. Herds are 
usually impounded until the fine is paid, with many people reporting abuse by the rangers towards the herders. The 
rules for grazing are not necessarily relaxed during times of drought. During a severe drought in 2009, OOC rangers 
worked round the clock, and particularly at night, removing cattle from the conservancy. They collected around 
US$3000 in grazing fines over a three-month period, which was subsequently spent on conservancy management and 
operational costs (KII 18). 
Land sales 
In all conservancies landowners are restricted from selling on their land without the approval of the conservancy land 
committee. This has deterred land sales within the conservancies, and if land is sold on, the new buyer must take on 
the conditions of the lease contract (KIIs 14 and 26). Conservancies have therefore been important in preventing 
onward sales, particularly when compared to the land sales prevalent prior to the conservancy, such as in the OOC. 
The Mara Maasai have in recent years become more land savvy; peer pressure from within the community, people 
having seen the importance of land to their livelihoods, and the increasing realisation of the significance of being 
excluded from land owned by others, have gone a long way to stop people selling their land, particularly to outsiders. 
 
                                                             
3  Using an exchange rate of US$1 to KSh80. 
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Being a prime tourism spot land speculation in the Mara is high, especially in areas close to the MMNR. Here land is 
sought after by people looking for an idyllic spot to build a home or a tourist lodge. Cattle barons from other 
neighbouring group ranches also favour land close to the MMNR. They are attracted by the opportunity to access the 
better quality and quantity of grass available in the MMNR, especially in times of drought (KIIs 14 and 19). 
Conservancies, many situated directly adjacent to the MMNR, have helped deter land sales in by offering landowners 
a regular income from their land. 
 
9  Conservancy land leases – livelihood opportunity or ‘green-grab’? 
9.1 Land based payments 
Conservancy land lease programmes in the Mara have been set up within a backdrop of a great land transformational 
change from communal to individual ownership following land subdivision. Dissatisfaction with previous wildlife 
approaches, and a change in land ownership, created an opening for a new conservation management model to be 
established. Land privatisation has been both an opportunity and threat to developing conservation and tourism 
initiatives in the Mara. An opportunity as individuals now own land on which they can independently choose to invest 
in, and benefit from, conservation; and a threat, as land subdivision fragments the rangelands and increases 
opportunities for development and fencing, adversely affecting wildlife numbers. 
 
Once clear title to land was established after land subdivision, tourism investors, through community spokesmen, 
introduced a conservation land lease scheme to landowners in tourism-attractive areas. The land leases require clear 
and strong land tenure, a feature common of direct payments for conservation, or in the wider application of 
payments for ecosystem services (Pagiola et al 2005). In the Mara, tourism investors had to wait until the prolonged 
subdivision and allocation process was complete (e.g. in the case of Naboisho) before initiating a land lease scheme. 
Clear land title is important if investors are to guarantee long-term investments (Pagiola et al 2005). Eligibility to 
participate in the land lease scheme is therefore dependent on owning land, and owning land in the conservancy. 
 
As a result, conservancies exclude the landless or those with land parcels outside of a conservancy area. Privatisation 
of land in the Mara led to an unequal distribution of land with some people losing out on land altogether (Thompson 
et al 2009). Those individuals with greater influence that were able to secure the largest and best placed lands are 
thus more likely to participate in, and benefit from, conservancy land leases. Such schemes may not be helping the 
poor as much as they are those already having large and well-positioned land parcels. These people are also more 
likely to also own land elsewhere, being able to secure further land through land subdivision or have the capital to buy 
land, and will thus have more options of grazing and settlement away from the restrictions of a conservancy. A 
common tendency of land-based payments such as these is that they often exclude those without land or those with 
the fewest initial land-use rights, or the ‘poorest of the poor’ (Grieg-Gran et al 2005; Wunder 2008). This questions the 
poverty alleviating ability of such schemes and challenges de Soto’s argument that formalising property rights is a 
means to increase the poor’s economic power. 
 
Another consequence of such land-based payments is that marginalised groups — such as women and the youth — 
will be largely left out. Women were not entitled to allocation of land during group ranch subdivision, and 
consequently there are very few women owning land within a conservancy. Interviews with the managers of two 
conservancies revealed that less than 1% of its members are women (KIIs 14 & 18). Women as a result are largely 
uninformed about the conservancies around them, even those whose husbands are members, and they rely on their 
husbands and/or male relatives for both information and benefit sharing (Community interviews). Some 
conservancies have now recognised this and have started awareness raising initiatives with women and the youth. 
The benefits 
Nonetheless, many people do now own land in the subdivided group ranches (Thompson et al 2009), and a large 
number of people in these ranches have now joined a land lease scheme (figure 5). To participating households, 
conservancy land leases have the potential to distribute high revenues. The highest lease payments  currently 
available from conservancies in Koyiaki match some of the highest returns available from wildlife in the rangelands in 
Kenya, and dependent on rainfall, can compete with revenues from livestock, and to a lesser extent, cropping 
(Norton-Griffiths & Said 2010). When the initial lease payment was set, efforts were made by the tourism investors to 
match these to the agricultural value of the land, although at the start they did fall below this (KIIs 3, 14, 15 & 19). 
With subsequent yearly increases, the lease payments are now becoming a competitive land use option. 
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Using the 150 acres (60ha) theoretically owing to each group ranch member at land subdivision as a possible land size 
of a participating member in a land lease scheme, and a US$40 ha-1/yr-1 payment amount, a conservancy member 
could earn US$2 400 per year from land leases4. Thompson’s et al (2009) study in 2004 encompassing the same area 
found a mean household annual income of US$2 625 of which income from conservation contributed just US$600. 
Incomes now available from conservation through land leases are likely to be considerably more than what was 
available from tourism and conservation before conservancy land leases came into operation. Added to this, 
conservancies have also set up Trusts that offer support and benefits to the wider community, and thus reach out 
further than the land-based payments. Such high payments however may not be a common feature of other 
rangeland areas, even with good wildlife and tourism potential in Kenya. Due to the high volume of tourists visiting 
the Mara, and its reputation as a world-class wildlife destination — the annual wildebeest migration in the Mara was 
rated as one of the new Seven Wonders of the World in 2006 — the revenues available from wildlife in the Mara are 
some of the highest in Kenya. In comparison, Kitengela Wildlife Lease Programme, next to Nairobi National Park, 
offers landowners’ US$10 ha-1/yr-1 to leave their land unfenced and by 2004 covered 3 480ha and 118 landowners’ 
parcels (Reid et al 2008). The Mara therefore probably represents the top end of potential wildlife revenues in Kenya. 
Land rights respected 
Conservancy land leases respect existing rights to land as land ownership is retained with the landowners through a 
landowner-owned landholding company. Kenyan law puts tight control on the foreign ownership of agricultural land, 
under which land in the Mara falls, and as a result the largely foreign tourism investors are unable to hold the leases 
themselves. This has given the conservancy landowners stronger bargaining power in the partnership with the tourism 
investors. 
 
Subdivision has provided many Maasai with secure tenure and strong rights to land. Those without secure property 
rights are often the first to lose their land in acquisitions by outsider investors (Zoomers 2010). In Tanzania, local land 
rights can be weak and are largely state-controlled. The Tanzanian government is able to grant large areas of land to 
foreign investors as tourism and hunting concessions, effectively appropriating land from local communities. For 
example, the Tanzania government granted as concession the whole of the Loliondo hunting block to a wealthy 
investor from the United Arab Emirates through the Ortello Business Corporation (OBC) (Nelson 2004; Nelson et al 
2009). In another case, American financier and eco-philanthropist, Paul Tudor Jones, was granted 140 000ha to create 
Grumeti Reserves Ltd, an exclusive safari destination (Galaty 2011; Igoe 2007). Both these deals created a lot of 
controversy with local communities, threatening local land rights, displacing livestock grazing and in the case of OBC, 
resulting in the forced eviction and burning of homes (FEMACT 2009). The significant revenues the Tanzanian state 
receives from these highly centralised forms of investment might explain their interest in leasing land to foreign 
investors. Furthermore, the state is able to extends its power and control to community-based tourism initiatives in 
village areas by imposing considerable fees or even criminalising any locally-negotiated joint ventures between 
villages and tourism operators, which tend to provide much higher village-level benefits and a more assured form of 
local land rights (Nelson et al 2009). 
 
Ownership, and strong rights to land, are important in creating incentives for landowners to protect something rather 
than exploit it, and can be closely correlated with conservation friendly behaviour (Barrow & Murphree 2001; Ostrom 
et al 1999). The value of ownership to landowners can perhaps be seen in the dismissal of a recent proposal by the 
African Parks Network (APN) to join the conservancies in the Mara under a single management and governance 
structure. The APN proposed to provide management expertise and financial support for the conservancies, on the 
basis that a private company would hold the leases where shares were held by all key stakeholders, rather than by the 
separate conservancy landowners’ companies. The proposal was rejected by conservancy members who saw it as 
taking away too much of their current ownership rights to conservancy land (KIIs 14 & 18). 
9.2 Land grabbing by political elites in the Mara 
The desire not to relinquish their rights to land might stem from a long history of politicians, leaders and other elites 
misusing their power to acquire the best tourism land or gain access to lucrative tourism deals (see Box 1 for this 
wider trend in Kenya). The Mara is rife with examples of the powerful and politically-able misappropriating 
conservation land and tourism resources for their own personal benefit. For example, a former treasurer of the Narok 
County Council (NCC), Livingstone Ole Ntutu, allegedly grabbed 4 000 acres of land inside the MMNR during his time in 
office (Wikileaks 2011). The current MP for Narok North and a cabinet minister, and former chair of the NCC, William 
                                                             
4 The calculated payment amount should however be treated with some caution as there is likely to be large fluctuation in 
members’ parcel sizes as a result of land subdivision, with some people having much smaller or much larger land sizes than the 150 
acres. 
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Ole Ntimama, owns the land on which two luxury lodges are built in the MMNR (Honey 1999; Hughes 2007). Another 
former chair of the NCC, Hassan Ole Kamwaro, owns the land on which a lodge was recently built in sensitive rhino 
habitat within the MMNR, despite widespread opposition on environmental grounds and a moratorium by the 
National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) on any new lodges in the reserve (Kemei & Limo 2010). These 
and other elites have used their positions within the county council to questionably allocate themselves land inside a 
national reserve, and thus theoretically held under public ownership. Outside of the reserve, elites manipulate the 
subdivision process to secure access to land with tourism lodges (Thompson & Homewood 2002). This is a trend also 
shown in this study (e.g. Naboisho), where leaders tried to grab land earmarked for camps in the run up to subdivision 
and conservancy formation. Ownership or a part-stake in a tourism lodge in the Mara is a very lucrative business 
option, providing returns many times higher than involvement in other tourism enterprises (Thompson & Homewood 
2002). This might explain the desire of leaders and other elites to secure access to these sites. 
Box 1: Land grabbing in Kenya 
Land in Kenya is an emotive issue, particularly in the context of stolen or grabbed land. The land grabbing 
phenomena in Kenya has a long history, touching most of its society. As Klopp (2000) puts it, ‘land grabbing is as 
old as Kenya itself, if not older’ with its origins in the colonial era when prime agricultural land was sold to white 
settlers. It is no secret that Kenya’s former presidents used land as political patronage with illegal land allocations 
increasing during election times. The Ndung’u Report details thousands of cases of irregular and illegal 
allocations of public land (such as forests, roads, schools) to Kenya’s political elite and well-connected (Southall 
2005). Increased public mobilisation and resistance to the privatisation of prominent public sites (Klopp 2000) and 
the violence after the disputed presidential election in 2007, was in part driven by historical grievances over land, 
thus highlight the sensitive nature of land issues to Kenyans. 
 
A new National Land Policy (NLP), adopted in 2009, and endorsed by the Kenyan Constitution in 2010 
(Republic of Kenya 2009, 2010)5, identifies and plans to address the historical land injustices through a National 
Land Commission. The NLP potentially offers a more positive outlook for ordinary Kenyans as it decentralises 
land administration and takes away presidential powers to freely allocate land6. ‘Trust land’ is changed to 
‘community land’ and therefore not ‘held in trust’ and sold off by local county councils, but instead administered 
by local communities. The policy gives special attention to pastoral land rights and tries to strengthen them, 
recognising the dispossession of pastoral land. Foreign ownership of land is also limited whereby land ownership 
by non-citizens is reduced from a 999-year freehold title to a 99-year lease. This will particularly target many 
foreign individuals and companies owning large lands granted by the colonial government under 999-year 
freehold titles. The NLP, however, lacks a strong implementation process so its actual impact is yet to be seen. 
 
Improved governance model 
Although conservancies don’t stop the monopoly leaders and elites have on prime tourism sites and areas with lodges 
— much of this was an outcome of the subdivision process before most conservancies were set up — conservancies 
enable each landowner to receive an equitable share of tourism revenues. Here it is important to differentiate 
between ‘equitable’ and ‘equal’ payments. Although each landowner does not receive an equal share of tourism 
revenue, since this is dependent on land-size owned, they do share payments equitably, based on a transparent land 
rent payment system. The transparency of the land lease payment system allows landowners to clearly know how 
much they, and others, should be receiving, and has thus stopped the considerable leakage of revenue away from 
ordinary members to those involved in leadership positions as commonly occurred under the previous governance of 
wildlife revenues. Greater transparency in conservancy operations is also facilitated by the joint management 
structure that allows landowner participation through representation of the land committee in the investor-owned 
management company and in general conservancy management. The importance of a joint effort and shared 
approached for conservancy management is symbolised in the naming of the ‘Naboisho’ Conservancy — meaning 
‘coming together’ in the Maa language. 
                                                             
5 The latest Sessional Paper (No. 3) of the National Land Policy was passed by the Kenya Parliament in December 2009 
and the new constitution of Kenya was voted in by Kenyans and inaugurated in August 2010. 
6 Decentralisation of land administration has mobilised Kenyan civil society organisations as landowner and wildlife 
associations in rangeland communities have joined together to form the Kenya Rangelands Coalition. This umbrella 
organisation will collectively represent and coordinate interests of rangeland communities in the development of their 
lands. 
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However, the concept of the conservancy and land lease model has largely originated from outside, introduced to the 
landowners through community leaders. Participation of members is also largely restricted to indirect means through 
a supposedly democratically elected committee. Participation needs to go beyond that of elites, to the point where 
communities have good and informed information prior to making decisions to start investments (Vermeulem & 
Cotula 2010). Participation of communities in management decisions can be beneficial for conservation: local people 
have important local knowledge that can improve the management of resources; and participation brings a sense of 
local ownership and control that ultimately leads to an increased commitment for conservation. Goldman (2011) 
shows how the lack of participation of local Maasai in decision-making in a new conservation area in northern 
Tanzania led to a loss of local support for, and increased resentment towards, that conservation area. 
 
Monthly land lease payments provide landowners with a guaranteed payment regardless of tourism numbers and 
thus do provide an important safety net in times of tourism downturns. This is in contrast to the previous system of 
governance, which placed the burden of risk of tourism directly on the landowners or members involved. Tourism is a 
risky and unpredictable livelihood option, susceptible to concerns over economic and political stability and violence. 
For example, the Kenyan post-election violence and subsequent global economic crisis in 2008 caused a 19% drop in 
tourism in Kenya (Lumiti 2009). Guaranteed fixed revenue may therefore help to buffer the stress and shocks common 
in the tourism industry. This is dependent however on the tourism investors’ ability to guarantee the payment and 
ensure the sustainable financing of each land lease programme in the long term. The OOC investors survived the 2008 
tourism drop in the Mara when virtually no tourists came to the conservancy continuing to honour the lease 
payments; they must be able to do this in the long-term to ensure that landowners participate. 
 
Tourism investors must also give landowners a fair share of tourism revenues to maintain landowners’ interest in 
participating. Some landowners have already demanded higher payments, and on top of the land rent payment they 
want a share of the business profits (KII 14). The tourism investors are able to cover the cost of the land lease 
payment at 35% occupancy. Landowners do not receive a share of the profits if occupancy goes above the minimum, 
nor do they receive a share of profits from the lodge. Although the tourism investors are exposed to the majority of 
risks of the business, and as a result should no doubt receive a larger share of the profits, greater transparency is 
needed in the system of revenue allocation between the tourism investors and the landowners. The pressure on the 
tourism investors to give landowners a greater share of the revenues is increased as land values in the area rise, and 
landowners have alternative options and offers for the use of their land. 
Livelihood trade-offs 
Tourism is in direct competition against other livelihood activities such as livestock production where pastoral 
landowners have more experience and control. Land leasing largely excludes livestock grazing for all but a short period 
in the year, removing a large area of former grazing land. The lost opportunity cost of livestock production can 
therefore be great and leases may not be able to adequately compensate people who depend chiefly on livestock for 
their livelihoods. Those not participating in a land lease programme also face restrictions in where they graze their 
livestock or choose to live, but receive no payment in return. Pastoralists rarely view wildlife or tourism as a substitute 
to their usual livelihood activities, but rather as a possible way of supplementing them (DeLuca 2002; Homewood et al 
2009). Any income derived may then be directed to other activities where people have more control, including land 
uses perhaps in conflict with wildlife and tourism. As with other outside investments (Cotula et al 2009), conservancy 
land leases bring risks and opportunities to participating and non-participating households. Risks exist due to 
displacement, loss of access to resources important for livelihoods, and the relinquishing of what may be a 
household’s sole parcel of land for a long period of time. However, opportunities bring attractive financial benefits, 
new forms of employment, and access to markets and capital that might be hard to find otherwise. Households 
therefore experience large trade-offs in their livelihood choices and decision-making, which both Maasai and investors 
are as yet only just beginning to comprehend. 
9.3 Wider landscape effects 
Land leases slow the onward sale of land to outsiders, fencing and cultivation, all activities that threaten the 
rangelands for pastoralism or wildlife conservation. The re-aggregation of parcels, from individual, fragmented (and 
fenced7) plots into conservancies, leaves the rangelands intact and open for wildlife. If you exclude the limitations 
imposed on grazing, then this is also beneficial for livestock mobility. 
 
                                                             
7 Fencing within conservancy boundaries is negligible but is steadily increasing outside of conservancy boundaries (personal 
observation). 
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However, land leases displace livestock grazing and settlement elsewhere on the landscape, creating secondary 
problems in areas where people and cattle must relocate. Little is known as yet regarding the knock on effects of land 
leases on wildlife or vegetation inside or outside of conservancy boundaries. Research shows that the buying or 
leasing of land for conservation displaces development pressure to neighbouring areas, and this can undermine 
conservation goals, especially if neighbouring areas are of similarly high conservation value (Armsworth et al 2006). 
This becomes an even greater issue if larger areas are set aside for conservation and the available land remaining 
becomes limited (Armsworth et al 2006). In the Mara, a number of independent conservancies have been 
progressively set up, without any landscape or ecosystem plan combining them, and they now take up a large part of 
the Mara ecosystem. In order to understand the effects conservancies might be having on the ecological dynamics of 
the Mara, it is important to look not only at the conservancies themselves, but also at the broader landscape scale. 
This highlights the need for adequate monitoring programmes of habitats and species inside and outside of 
conservancies, before and after conservancies are set up. 
9.4 Government involvement 
Conservancies constitute a partnership between private sector tour operators and groups of landowners. So far there 
has been little government involvement in conservancies except through a regulatory role of issuing licences (e.g. in 
the registering of land leases through the Lands Office and licencing of lodges through NEMA). There is currently no 
national policy framework that recognises conservancies as a form of land use. A supportive national framework could 
be useful for subsequent conservancies to base themselves upon, and to help facilitate and promote these types of 
enterprises. Conservancy managers and landowners expressed desire for recognition of conservancies as a form of 
land use and tourism enterprise, and have now entered discussions with NEMA to formalise this. 
 
10 Conclusions 
Private sector investment in conservation is a growing trend across Africa. This paper has explored a new and 
innovative community-investor partnership between groups of Maasai landowners and the private sector in southern 
Kenya using land leases. Analysis of the partnership has shown that ownership of land under conservation is retained 
with Maasai landowners, respecting existing rights to land. The improved level of governance has also allowed 
participating members to receive attractive financial revenues, and is a large improvement to the previous governance 
of wildlife revenues in the Mara. However, as it is predominately a pastoral population, there are large trade-offs as 
land leases place serious restrictions on livestock grazing. Grazing management issues need to be seriously considered 
in these types of enterprises if they are to attract and maintain pastoral landowners’ interest in such schemes. 
 
Land privatisation in the Mara has opened up opportunities for conservation investment by tourism operators with 
local landowners. The subdivision of Kenya’s rangelands has tended to predominately benefit elites, and as a 
consequence this trend is reinforced in land-based schemes such as these. Elite benefit is a common tendency of 
conservation initiatives in general (Leisher et al 2010). Given the large extent and recent change in ownership in these 
areas, land leases do however keep the lands they cover together and are potentially an optimistic outlook for such 
open rangeland areas. Consideration however must be given to adjacent areas and communities that may face the 
negative knock on effects of such schemes. Mara is a unique area in terms of its tourism and wildlife, so land leases 
may not be able to offer as much to landowners in other areas, or be financially sustainable across vast areas. 
However, within the Mara, land leases have been rapidly expanded upon, implying that similar schemes might be of 
interest to both investors and communities alike in other wildlife areas. 
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